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LABELING THE NEW MEATS: 
APPLYING PREEXISTING PRINCIPLES TO THE 
REGULATION OF RADICAL PRODUCTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of the coming decade, the perception of what it means 
to be “meat” is going to radically change. Plant-based meat products have 
begun to mimic the taste and texture of meat so accurately that they are 
quickly becoming an acceptable alternative to traditional meat.1 In the near 
future, in vitro meat (or so-called “lab-grown” meat) will be an 
indistinguishable alternative to meat harvested from animals.2 These 
products promise to usher in a future of meat consumption unshackled from 
the animal suffering and environmental harm that are generally accepted 
today as a necessary evil in agriculture.3 With these new products will come 
new regulatory challenges, not least of which is the issue of how these new 
meat products should be labeled. 
This Note looks to past and present labeling regulations, as well as the 
theory behind labeling regulation, to argue for how the future labeling of 
meat substitutes should proceed. Section I of this Note introduces plant-
based and in vitro meat and explores the unique aspects and implications of 
each. Section II examines current state and federal regulations that will 
affect the labeling of meat substitutes. Section III delves into the essential 
considerations that must be weighed when contemplating the mandatory 
labeling of consumer food products. Section IV looks at labeling regulations 
of plant-based milk and genetically engineered food products, and uses 
these examples as indicators for how regulation of meat substitutes should 
or could progress. Section V proposes specific regulatory approaches for 
plant-based and in vitro meat considering likely and potential future 
developments, and finally argues that similar standards should be applied to 
traditional meat. 
 
1. See discussion infra Section I.A. 
2. Carolyn Mattick & Brad Allenby, The Future of Meat, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 2013, at 64, 
66; see also infra text accompanying note 34. 
3. For a discussion of the problems with traditional meat, see discussion infra Section V.C. 











I. MEAT ALTERNATIVES  
A. Plant-Based Meat 
It looks like meat, it tastes like meat, it even bleeds like meat, but take a 
closer look at the Impossible Burger’s ingredients and you will find an 
assortment of potato protein, wheat protein, as well as coconut and soy 
derivatives.4 The Impossible Burger is one of several recently debuted 
products that promise to turn our conception of meat on its head.5 However, 
these newcomers enter an already populated field of plant-based meats. 
While nobody is likely to mistake their products for actual meat, brands like 
Tofurky have spent several decades producing plant-based products 
intended to replace meat.6 Already, plant-based meats boast $670 million in 
yearly U.S. sales.7 
The most obvious benefit of plant-based meat is that it allows vegetarians 
and vegans to consume types of foods which are ordinarily reserved for the 
omnivorous masses. With an increasing number of Americans choosing to 
abstain from meat,8 it is no wonder that plant-based meats are seeing a 
steady growth in sales.9 This increased popularity of plant-based foods is 
likely also the result of people trying to cut down on meat consumption due 
to the perceived immorality of factory farming.10 Globally, the popularity 
of meat-free diets largely comes from religious traditions that hold a 
 
4. Matt Simon, The Impossible Burger: Inside the Strange Science of the Fake Meat that 
‘Bleeds,’ WIRED (Sept. 20, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-impossible-burger/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/PSD3-RYNC]. 
5. Impossible Foods is the maker of the new Impossible Burger, but competitor Beyond Meat 
has also recently debuted their faux burger. Mahita Gajanan, The Meat Industry Has Some Serious Beef 
with Those ‘Bleeding’ Plant-Based Burgers, TIME (Mar. 21, 2018), http://time.com/5181524/impossible 
-burger-plant-based/ [https://perma.cc/93T5-6LLY]. 
6. Our Story: Our Roots, TOFURKY, https://tofurky.com/our-story/our-roots/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5V99-GVP5]. 
7. Press Release, Plant Based Foods Ass’n, Plant-Based Food Sales Grow 20 Percent 1 (July 
30, 2018), https://plantbasedfoods.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/PBFA-Release-on-Nielsen-Data-7. 
30.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER7X-B24P]. 
8. Marcelo Gleiser, Is a No-Meat World Really Better?, NPR (June 28, 2017, 4:32 PM), https:// 
www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2017/06/28/532880755/is-a-no-meat-world-really-better [https://perma.cc/ 
3PVG-LBRT] (finding a general trend of increasing numbers of Americans choosing meat-free diets). 
9. See Plant Based Foods Ass’n, supra note 7 (showing plant-based meat sales increased 6 
percent in 2017 and 24 percent in 2018). 
10. A 2017 Ipsos Group survey found that 54 percent of U.S. adults were trying to consume 
fewer animal products and more plant-based products, 69.6 percent have some discomfort with the way 
animals are used in the food industry, and 48.9 percent support an outright ban on factory farming. Jacy 
Reese, Survey of US Attitudes Towards Animal Farming and Animal-Free Food October 2017, 
SENTIENCE INST. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/animal-farming-attitudes-survey-












vegetarian diet to be a moral good.11 Although the perceived immorality of 
traditional meat is a major reason that people consume meat alternatives, it 
is far from the only reason to do so.  
The environmental impact of producing plant-based meat is much 
smaller than producing traditional meat, meaning more plant-based meat 
substitution would be good for the environment.12 Livestock activities 
produce an estimated 18 percent of total human-caused greenhouse gas 
emissions, and they produce nearly 80 percent of all emissions related to 
agriculture.13 Beyond greenhouse gases, raising livestock has a tremendous 
negative impact on water supplies14 and bio-diversity.15 A final often-
overlooked problem with using animals for food is that feeding and housing 
animals takes up a lot of space. Livestock production currently uses 30 
percent of the world’s land area—much of which could be given back to 
native plant and animal species and reforested if consumption of traditional 
meat were to substantially decrease.16 
With meat consumption on the rise around the world, problems caused 
by traditional meat production will only get worse without substantial 
changes.17 Since the problems of traditional meat production result from the 
process of raising billions of animals, a remedy might be found in divorcing 
meat from animals altogether. One way to accomplish this is through a 
large-scale transition to plant-based meat consumption, but another is 
production of real meat outside the bodies of animals. 
B. “Lab-Grown” Meat 
While plant-based “meat” products are currently disrupting the meat 
industry, the meat substitute with the biggest long-term potential is real meat 
grown in a laboratory rather than in an animal.18 Since the product is still in 
its infancy, many terms are currently used to refer to meat grown outside of 
 
11. See Jo Ann Davidson, World Religions and the Vegetarian Diet, J. ADVENTIST 
THEOLOGICAL SOC’Y, Fall 2003, at 114, 114–18 (exploring the strong traditions in Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and Jainism that find consumption of meat to be immoral and encourage a vegetarian diet). 
12. See Simon, supra note 4 (noting the environmental benefits of switching to plant-based 
meats). 
13. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND 
OPTIONS, at xxi, 112 (2006) [hereinafter LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW], http://www.fao.org/3/a0701e/a 
0701e.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB63-G3J4]. 
14. Id. at 167–69. 
15. Id. at 214–15.  
16. Id. at 74. 
17. See id. at 7–11 (explaining that urbanization and economic growth are shifting global dietary 
preferences toward meat, which combines with an increasing global population to greatly increase 
overall demand for meat). Despite increasing consumption of meat substitutes in the developed world, 
global economic and population growth largely in the developing world have caused a net increase in 
global meat consumption likely to continue in the near future. 
18. See Mattick & Allenby, supra note 2, at 66; see also infra text accompanying notes 34–35. 











an animal, including: “synthetic meat,” “lab-meat,” and “cultured meat.”19 
In this Note, I will use the term “in vitro meat,” which has a comparatively 
neutral connotation and has been used in much of the scientific and legal 
literature on the topic.20 While in vitro meat has great potential, it is not yet 
viable as a consumer product.21 However, with plant-based meats already 
on the market, now is the time for regulators to begin rethinking how they 
deal with meat and meat substitutes. 
In order for in vitro meat to become a viable consumer product, scientists 
will need to achieve greater efficiencies in the multi-step production 
process, the generalities of which are unlikely to change.22 The process 
starts with a few cells extracted from a living animal and ends with a full 
cut of meat. First, tissue is extracted from a live animal and the stem cells 
within are isolated.23 Next, these cells are grown in a three-dimensional 
scaffold to assume the same structure as traditional meat.24 A variety of cell 
types must be grown together in this scaffold, including fat, skeletal muscle, 
and other types of structural cells.25 Finally, the meat is conditioned—a 
process required to achieve the texture of traditional meat.26 Conditioning 
 
19. See, e.g., Patrick D. Hopkins & Austin Dacey, Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save 
Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters?, 21 J. AGRIC. ENVTL. ETHICS 579, 582, 585 (2008) (using the terms 
“biotechnologically produced meat,” “cultured meat,” “synthetic meat,” and “in vitro meat”). The terms 
“lab-meat” and “lab-grown meat” are more common in non-academic articles on the subject, and as a 
result are more well known. See, e.g., John Birdsall, Is Lab-Grown Meat Ready for Dinner?, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 16, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-lab-grown-meat-ready-for-dinner-1539 
701100 [https://perma.cc/39S4-9BJY]. 
20. “In vitro” means “outside the living body and in an artificial environment.” In Vitro, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20vitro [https://perma.cc/6PW 
W-MGBK]. In vitro meat is distinguished from traditional meat, which is produced “in vivo,” meaning 
“in the living body of a plant or animal.” In Vivo, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.co 
m/dictionary/in%20vivo [https://perma.cc/JNN6-NFLA]. In acknowledging that in vitro meat 
biologically is real meat, and to avoid confusion, I will also be referring to non-in vitro meat as 
“traditional meat” throughout this Note. 
21. Elie Dolgin, Lab-Grown Meat Gets Rare Funding Boost, 566 NATURE 161, 161 (2019) 
(“Despite the booming commercial interest in developing meat that is eco-friendly and ethically sound, 
critics argue that the industry lacks much of the scientific and engineering expertise needed to bring lab-
grown meat to the masses. . . . ‘There are lots of technical hurdles here to overcome’ . . . .” (quoting Paul 
Mozdziak, a muscle biologist at North Carolina State University in Raleigh)). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. While ordinarily these cells are sourced from the bodies of living animals, to further avoid 
animal suffering at least one in vitro meat producer has sourced stem cells from umbilical cords which 
would otherwise be discarded. Erin Brodwin, A New Lab-Grown Meat Startup Says It’s Overcome a 
Key Barrier to Making Meat Without Slaughter, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2018, 8:27 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/lab-grown-meat-startup-solving-barrier-meat-without-slaughter-meat 
able-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/BJA7-SXDF]. 
24. Marloes L.P. Langelaan et al., Meet the New Meat: Tissue Engineered Skeletal Muscle, 21 
TRENDS FOOD SCI. & TECH. 59, 61 (2010). 
25. Id. at 61.  












involves exercising the muscle cells through physical or electronic 
stimulation.27  
Challenges and inefficiencies exist at every stage of the production 
process.28 Major challenges include cell sourcing, producing muscle strands 
longer than those found in ground meat, and approximating the taste and 
color of meat without artificial additives.29 Only when these and other 
challenges are overcome can in vitro meat be made indistinguishable from 
traditional meat and sold at a competitive price. While the first publicly 
consumed in vitro meat product was a hamburger produced for $335,000 in 
2013,30 experts predict that certain in vitro meat products will be 
commercially viable within only a few years.31 
Once viable, in vitro meat promises many of the same benefits as plant-
based meats. While in vitro meat requires the use of actual animal tissue, its 
production process avoids the necessity of slaughter and would eliminate 
the need for animal suffering outside of the initial cell extraction process.32 
It also offers many of the same environmental benefits of eliminating the 
massive land use and carbon dioxide output from raising animals for meat 
production.33 Moreover, unlike plant-based meat, in vitro meat could 
become indistinguishable from cuts of traditional meat.34 The product could 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 63. 
29. Id. at 63–64. 
30. Mattick & Allenby, supra note 2, at 64–65.  
31. Id. at 65. Major in vitro meat companies generally plan on having their products on the 
market by 2021. See Terence Chea, Meat from a Lab? Startups Cook Up Alternative to Slaughter, 
DENVER POST (July 9, 2019, 6:56 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/07/09/startups-cell-based-cu 
ltured-meats/ [https://perma.cc/3V8S-FCFW] (profiling Memphis Meats which expects to be viable by 
2021); Andrés González & Silke Koltrowitz, The $280,000 Lab-Grown Burger Could Be a More 
Palatable $10 in Two Years, REUTERS (July 9, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fo 
od-tech-labmeat/the-280000-lab-grown-burger-could-be-a-more-palatable-10-in-two-years-idUSKCN 
1U41W8 [https://perma.cc/DAG9-Y77N] (Biotech Foods in 2021). 
32. Taylor A. Mayhall, The Meat of the Matter: Regulating a Laboratory-Grown Alternative, 74 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 161 (2019) (“[V]egans, vegetarians, and animal lovers may prefer laboratory 
meat for its animal welfare implications. . . . Many believe the current practices to be inhumane for 
animals who are raised solely to breed and die. ‘Victimless’ meat is a winning solution for those ethically 
concerned.”). Despite the decreased suffering associated with production of in vitro meat, it is not 
universally supported by vegans and vegetarians. When PETA, a popular animal rights group, 
announced a one-million-dollar prize for the first commercial in vitro meat product, some within the 
organization opposed the move, arguing that in vitro meat strengthened the idea that eating animal flesh 
can be ethical. John Schwartz, PETA’s Latest Tactic: $1 Million for Fake Meat, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/21/us/21meat.html [https://perma.cc/GR92-XPLZ].  
33. See LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW, supra note 13; Jennifer Penn, “Cultured Meat”: Lab-
Grown Beef and Regulating the Future Meat Market, 36 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 104, 109–11 
(2018). But see John Lynch & Raymond Pierrehumbert, Climate Impacts of Cultured Meat and Beef 
Cattle, FRONTIERS SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYS., Feb. 2019, at 1, 8 (finding that “[r]eplacing cattle systems 
with cultured meat production before energy generation is sufficiently decarbonized and/or the more 
optimistic production footprints presented here are realized (assuming they can be), could risk a long-
term, negative climate impact”). 
34. Mattick & Allenby, supra note 2, at 66. 











even go beyond indistinguishability and be engineered to be more nutritious 
and flavorful than traditional meat.35 However, because the future of in vitro 
meat is speculative, so are the benefits.36 
The speculative future of in vitro meat cuts both ways. Because in vitro 
meat is an innovative product, it could be harmful in its disruption of the 
current meat economy.37 For instance, in vitro meat could exacerbate 
poverty in developing countries with primarily agricultural economies by 
shifting the production of meat back into industrialized economies.38 Some 
also fear that the complexity and novelty of in vitro meat might make the 
product unforeseeably dangerous.39  
In vitro meat’s future is speculative partially because its adoption largely 
depends on public opinion. Many people have a negative perception of in 
vitro meat, considering it to be inauthentic or unnatural.40 These perceptions 
threaten the product’s success,41 but they are likely malleable.42  
Negative perceptions of in vitro meat also derive from ethical concerns 
regarding possible uses and effects of the technology. One ethical issue with 
in vitro meat is the potential for production of “unethical” meats. A person 
could, for instance, produce in vitro meat from human cells.43 The potential 
for in vitro meat to violate cultural taboos around cannibalism is real, but 
this application of the technology is unlikely to materialize. Most new 
technologies can be used to violate deep-seated taboos and fundamental 
social norms, but rarely are such violations realized. One need only look to 
cloning technology to see that such fears are generally misplaced—
livestock are now regularly cloned, but despite widespread panic a decade 
ago about the ethical implications of cloning technology, no human has ever 
 
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 64–65 (emphasizing the uncertain future of in vitro meat and the possibility of 
negative consequences).  
37. Id. at 67–68.  
38. Id. at 68. But see Penn, supra note 33, at 112–13 (suggesting that in vitro meat could help to 
address food insecurity). 
39. Hopkins & Dacey, supra note 19, at 585–86. 
40. Clemens Driessen & Michiel Korthals, Pig Towers and In Vitro Meat: Disclosing Moral 
Worlds by Design, 42 SOC. STUD. SCI. 797, 807, 810 (2012). 
41. Mattick & Allenby, supra note 2, at 65. 
42. See Driessen & Korthals, supra note 40, at 807–08 (suggesting that current widespread 
cultural taboos around human corpses could naturally extend to animal corpses if the concept of meat 
was separated from the necessity of a corpse); Christopher J. Bryant et al., Strategies for Overcoming 
Aversion to Unnaturalness: The Case of Clean Meat, 154 MEAT SCI. 37, 44 (2019) (finding that 
messages that highlight the unnaturalness of conventional meat were effective in overcoming consumer 
concerns); Christopher Bryant & Julie Barnett, Consumer Acceptance of Cultured Meat: A Systematic 
Review, 143 MEAT SCI. 8 (2018) (reviewing empirical studies of consumer acceptance of in vitro meat). 
43. Zachary Schneider, Comment, In Vitro Meat: Space Travel, Cannibalism, and Federal 












been cloned.44 A final ethical concern is the status of current farm animals 
should they be entirely replaced by in vitro meat production.45 Domesticated 
pigs, cows, and chickens could find that they have no place in a world 
without a traditional meat industry. While interesting to consider, such a 
world is far too distant and speculative for the question to have any logical 
bearing on current practices and regulation.46 Despite ethical qualms, and 
despite mixed public opinion, in vitro meat is coming and regulators have 
already begun to consider its impact. 
II. CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED REGULATION 
With the viability of plant-based and in vitro meat as large-scale 
substitutes for traditional meat just over the horizon,47 states and the federal 
government are beginning to take steps to regulate these products. Missouri 
was the first state to enact labeling regulations when it sharply curtailed the 
ability to market meat substitutes as meat.48 Meanwhile, the federal 
government has taken preliminary steps to create a framework for 
regulatory authority over in vitro meat.49 The steps taken at this point by 
states and the federal government are not definitive. However, they establish 
the groundwork for how the next decade of regulatory developments are 
likely to progress. 
A. Missouri and State-Level Regulation 
In August 2018, a bold new Missouri law went into effect that aimed to 
exclude in vitro and plant-based “meats” from the legal definition of meat.50 
Under this new law, it is a misdemeanor to represent a product as meat that 
“is not derived from harvested production livestock or poultry.”51 Initially, 
the enforcement implications of the new act were unclear, and 
 
44. For a discussion of the debate around cloning regulation, see John F. Murphy, Mandatory 
Labeling of Food Made from Cloned Animals: Grappling with Moral Objections to the Production of 
Safe Products, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 131 (2008). 
45. Hopkins & Dacey, supra note 19, at 590. 
46. See id. at 590–91 (suggesting that a slow transition to in vitro meat would likely result in a 
similarly slow decline in livestock populations and would be unlikely to cause a crisis of excess 
livestock). 
47. While plant-based meats are currently viable as large-scale substitutes for some meat 
products—like ground beef—they are not yet viable alternatives to meat products as a whole. See Dana 
Hatic, Impossible Foods Will Attempt the Impossible: A ‘World-Class’ Meatless Steak, EATER (Jan. 11, 
2019, 9:12 AM), https://www.eater.com/2019/1/11/18177441/impossible-foods-fake-meat-substitute-st 
eak [https://perma.cc/R629-MEZW].  
48. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
49. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
50. Act of June 1, 2018 Mo. Laws 1014 (codified in scattered sections of tit. X, XVI, XVII). 
51. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 265.494, 265.496 (2018). 











manufacturers of meat-substitute products feared for the worst.52 However, 
later guidance from the Missouri Department of Agriculture stated that meat 
substitutes could still use the term “Meat” in their labeling so long as the 
term was accompanied by an appropriate qualifier like “Plant-Based.”53 
Perceptions of the Act’s intent are mixed. Proponents claim the Act will 
prevent customers from being misled; opponents view the law as a shield 
protecting the traditional meat industry from competition.54 The enacting 
legislators’ intentions appear to be a combination of these two 
understandings. They claim to be protecting Missouri’s cattle industry from 
competition with meat alternatives, and they assert that such competition is 
only possible due to misrepresentations about meat alternatives.55 Because 
labeling restrictions diminish the ability of meat alternatives to compete, it 
is not surprising that the first state to enact such a restriction is also a major 
livestock producer.56  
Missouri is not unique in enacting legislation to protect a domestic food 
industry. State regulation of food often favors local products, a tendency 
that has led courts to find many state food regulations unconstitutional.57 In 
response to what they see as an unfair targeting of meat substitutes, a 
coalition of organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) of Missouri, Tofurkey, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund, have 
come together to challenge Missouri’s new law.58 The coalition alleges that 
the labeling law is unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
a legal doctrine that prevents states from discriminating against or unduly 
burdening interstate commerce.59 
 
52. See Amy Martyn, Missouri Is About to Criminalize Using the Word ‘Meat’ to Sell Meat 
Substitutes, CONSUMERAFFAIRS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/missouri-is-
about-to-criminalize-using-the-word-meat-to-sell-meat-substitutes-082818.html [https://perma.cc/39L4 
-3S4C] (explaining that the Missouri Attorney General’s office has refused to clarify how it will enforce 
this law). 
53. Memorandum from the Mo. Dep’t of Agric. to the Meat Inspection Program, Missouri’s Meat 
Advertising Law (Aug. 30, 2018), https://agriculture.mo.gov/animals/pdf/missouri-meat-advertising-
guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKG8-ARNW]. 
54. Madison Park, ‘Fake Meat’ Is at the Center of Food Fight in Missouri, CNN (Aug. 29, 2018, 
9:55 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/health/missouri-meat-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/M 
MW6-Q8MR].  
55. See Martyn, supra note 52. 
56. Rob Cook, Ranking of States with the Most Beef Cows, BEEF2LIVE (Jan. 14, 2020), http://be 
ef2live.com/story-ranking-states-beef-cows-0-108181 [https://perma.cc/K2QM-DB2U] (showing that 
Missouri ranks third among states in the number of beef cows).  
57. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
58. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19–21, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. 
Richardson, No. 2:18-CV-04173 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2018); Lawsuit Raises the Stakes in Food Fight 
Over the Term “Meat,” ACLU MO. (Aug. 27, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.aclu-
mo.org/en/news/lawsuit-raises-stakes-food-fight-over-term-meat [https://perma.cc/8YQG-R3FP] 
[hereinafter ACLU].  












State food regulations have a long history of being struck down under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.60 Because Missouri’s labeling restriction 
equally affects meat substitutes produced in-state and out-of-state, it is 
facially neutral.61 But facially neutral laws can still be unconstitutional 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause when they have the effect or purpose 
of favoring in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic 
interests.62 
Missouri’s labeling law appears to have been enacted with such a 
discriminatory purpose. State legislators have explained their support of the 
law, saying, “[w]e wanted to protect our cattlemen in Missouri,”63 and “[a]ll 
we’re trying to do is basically just protect our meat industry.”64 The law also 
appears to have a discriminatory effect. By limiting how substitutes for 
traditional meat can be represented, Missouri is impairing these products’ 
ability to appeal to consumers and compete with traditional meat.65 Since 
Missouri is a major producer of traditional meat but not meat substitutes, 
the effect of the law is to favor in-state products over out-of-state products.66 
Because the labeling law was enacted with a discriminatory purpose and has 
a discriminatory effect, Missouri’s law is likely unconstitutional under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.67 
Missouri is not the only state to enact a meat labeling law. Several other 
states have passed broadly similar laws, including Arkansas and 
Mississippi, where similar lawsuits were also brought.68 As this issue 
 
60. See Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 356 (finding local processing requirement for milk to be 
unconstitutional); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351–54 (1977) (finding 
regulations protecting local apple industry from out-of-state competition to be unconstitutional under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (finding an 
exemption from taxation for an alcoholic beverage only produced locally to be unconstitutional under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause).  
61. Laura Murphy et al., More than Curiosity: The Constitutionality of State Labeling 
Requirements for Genetically Engineered Foods, 38 VT. L. REV. 477, 540 (2013) (explaining that a law 
is facially neutral when distinctions are not made between in-state and out-of-state business or products). 
62. See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351 (finding a state labeling law for apples unconstitutional due 
to its discriminatory effect on out-of-state apple producers); Bacchus Imps., 468 U.S. at 271–73 (finding 
a state tax exemption for a local product unconstitutional because of both its discriminatory purpose and 
discriminatory effect favoring in-state producers). 
63. See Sara Brown, How Missouri Began to Tackle Fake Meat: Missouri Sen. Sandy Crawford, 
DROVERS (May 31, 2018, 8:03 AM), https://www.drovers.com/article/how-missouri-began-tackle-fake-
meat-missouri-sen-sandy-crawford (quoting Sen. Sandy Crawford). 
64. Martyn, supra note 52 (quoting Rep. Jay Houghton). 
65. See ACLU, supra note 58. 
66. Missouri is home to no major players in the meat substitute industry. However, Missouri’s 
traditional animal and animal products industry had over eight billion dollars in sales in 2016. MO. DEP’T 
OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF MISSOURI AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 28 (2016), https://a 
griculture.mo.gov/economicimpact/county-pdf/MissouriAgForestryEconomicContributionStudy.pdf [h 
ttps://perma.cc/DH4H-9ACC] (author’s calculations). 
67. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351; Bacchus Imps., 468 U.S. at 271–73. 
68. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Soman, No. 
4:19-cv-000514-KGB (E.D. Ark. July 22, 2019); Alina Selyukh, What Gets to Be a ‘Burger’? States 











becomes more prominent and as more states take meat labeling into their 
own hands, the federal agencies that regulate food labeling may choose to 
step in to preempt state laws with a uniform standard. 
B. Federal Regulation 
Federal regulation of food, including food labeling, is primarily 
performed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA).69 While the FDA has wide-
ranging authority over most food products, the USDA is only responsible 
for the regulation of meat, poultry, and other select animal products.70 The 
lines of authority between these two bodies are not always straightforward. 
While the USDA regulates the meat of all traditionally farmed land animals, 
the FDA regulates a diverse group of other meat products.71 Further 
confusing the line is the FDA’s jurisdiction over additives to meat 
products.72  
Plant-based meat substitutes clearly fall under FDA jurisdiction since 
they contain no animal products, but authority over in vitro meat is less 
clear.73 On March 7, 2019, the FDA and USDA released a formal agreement 
for shared authority over in vitro meat.74 Under this plan, the FDA will 
oversee cell collection, growth, and differentiation, while the USDA will 
oversee harvest, production, and labeling.75 Regardless of whether this is a 
sound strategy for regulation, there is a question of whether this is proper 
under the entities’ statutory authorizations. 
The statutory argument for USDA authority over in vitro meat rests upon 
the assertion that in vitro meat fits the definition of a “meat food product” 
under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA).76 The FMIA gives the 
 
Restrict Labels on Plant-Based Meat, NPR (July 23, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesa 
lt/2019/07/23/744083270/what-gets-to-be-a-burger-states-restrict-labels-on-plant-based-meat [https://p 
erma.cc/USC6-TEAR].  





72. What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.go 
v/about-fda/fda-basics/what-does-fda-regulate [https://perma.cc/KFN8-V9F8].  
73. Id. 
74. U.S. Food & Drug Admin. & U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Formal Agreement Between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration and U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Office of Food Safety (Mar. 7, 2019) [hereinafter Formal Agreement], https://www.fsis.usda 
.gov/wps/wcm/connect/0d2d644a-9a65-43c6-944f-ea598aacdec1/Formal-Agreement-FSIS-FDA.pdf? 
MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/U7GX-BVAB]. 
75. Id. at 2–3. 
76. 21 U.S.C. § 601(j) (2018). The definition of “poultry product” in the Poultry Products 












USDA authority, including labeling authority,77 over meat food products.78 
A meat food product is defined as an edible product made from any “portion 
of the carcass” of various traditionally farmed mammals.79 “Carcass” is not 
a defined term in the statute, so Congress presumably meant for it to go by 
its ordinary meaning—the dead body of an animal.80 Going by ordinary 
meaning, the statute arguably does not give the USDA authority over in 
vitro meat because in vitro meat itself is not the carcass of an animal, as it 
is grown independently of a body, and does not contain any portion of the 
carcass of an animal.81 Alternatively, in vitro meat could plausibly be 
considered an animal carcass despite never having been part of an animal’s 
body because the cellular line originated in an animal’s body.82 
Unlike the USDA, the FDA has a generalized authority to regulate food 
products.83 This generalized authority to regulate food is limited by the 
exemption from authority for all meat and meat food products regulated by 
the USDA.84 Therefore, if the USDA cannot regulate in vitro meat because 
it does not contain any portion of an animal carcass, the FDA would have 
authority to regulate in vitro meat under its general authority to regulate 
food. 
For the FDA to have authority over collection, growth, and 
differentiation, and for the USDA to then have authority over harvest, 
production, and labeling, the cells at issue cannot be a carcass until the 
 
vitro meat derived from domestically raised poultry. 21 U.S.C. § 453(f) (2018). Because the PPIA came 
after the FMIA, and uses nearly identical language, poultry does not require separate analysis because 
the statutory frameworks for FMIA and meat regulation under the Act are equally applicable to the PPIA 
and poultry regulation. 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–72 (2018). 
77. 21 U.S.C. § 607 (2018). 
78. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–26 (2018). 
79. 21 U.S.C. § 601(j). A poultry product is similarly defined as an edible product made from 
“any poultry carcass, or part thereof.” 21 U.S.C. § 453(f). 
80. See Carcass, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/carcass 
[https://perma.cc/XQ74-VC7E] (defining carcass as “1: a dead body . . . especially : the dressed body of 
a meat animal . . . 2: the living, material, or physical body . . . 4: the underlying structure or frame of 
something”); see also LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 8 (2014) (“Words that are not terms of art and that are not 
statutorily defined are customarily given their ordinary meanings, frequently derived from the 
dictionary.”). 
81. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. Since initially extracted stem cells can 
replicate nearly indefinitely, it is unlikely that in vitro meat would contain any cells which were 
previously in a living animal. Langelaan et al., supra note 24, at 60. 
82. See Langelaan et al., supra note 24, at 60–61 (discussing how stem cells sourced from the 
bodies of animals are used to produce in vitro meat ). 
83. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2018) (“[The Secretary] shall promulgate regulations fixing and 
establishing for any food, under its common or usual name so far as practicable, a reasonable definition 
and standard of identity, a reasonable standard of quality, or reasonable standards of fill of container.”); 
see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 342–43 (2018). 
84. 21 U.S.C. § 392 (2018). 











USDA takes over.85 The agencies appear to contemplate a production 
process wherein cells are grown and then assembled into meat products.86 
To comply with the statutory authorizations, the definition of “carcass” 
must include fully assembled meat products which resemble cuts of meat, 
but not include disorganized collections of cells.87 Given the common 
definition of “carcass,” this is a stretched interpretation of the statutes, albeit 
one that is necessary to accomplish the desired cooperative regulation.88 If 
the agencies proceed with their planned regulatory framework, the USDA 
will have authority over labeling. However, this framework is susceptible 
to legal challenges due to the unclear statutory authority on which it 
stands.89 
III. REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 
Historically, the primary purpose of labeling regulation has been to 
ensure that consumers know the content of their food.90 Labeling regulations 
can also serve several secondary functions. Regulations can mandate or 
allow disclosure of the process by which food is produced. When the 
process of production does not affect the content of food, process 
disclosures allow consumers to make consumption choices based on ethical 
considerations. Regulation of labeling is not always necessary, and should 
 
85. The question of who has authority essentially comes down to the definition of “carcass.” See 
discussion of authority supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. To fit the statute, the announced 
division of authority requires that the material at issue not be a carcass under FDA authority, then 
become a carcass under USDA authority. To further complicate matters, USDA authority only 
encompasses meat from most traditionally farmed animals. 21 U.S.C. § 601(j) (2018). Therefore, the 
announced division of authority will only work with the cells of such animals. 
86. The FDA would have authority over the collection of the initial stem cells, the growth of 
these cells, and their differentiation into various types of cells found in meat. Formal Agreement, supra 
note 74, at 2–3. The USDA would have authority over the process of “harvesting” these cells from where 
they were grown, producing meat products out of them, and labeling these meat products. Id. at 3. This 
process of production is somewhat different from the one described in Section I.B. See supra notes 
23–27 and accompanying text. The difference is unsurprising because it is not yet clear what large-scale 
in vitro meat production will look like. 
87. Such an interpretation is somewhat justifiable—one would not generally refer to a single cell 
as a carcass. However, growth of cells in vitro is done not individually but rather in large groups.  
88. For the common meaning of “carcass,” see supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
89. Walter G. Johnson, Conflict over Cell-Based Meat: Who Should Coordinate Agencies in U.S. 
Biotechnology Regulation?, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 478, 489 (2019) (“The jurisdictional debacle over 
cell-based meat ultimately yielded a compromise, but only after months of uncertainty and clashes 
between stakeholders and regulators. Though the FDA-USDA agreement represents a temporary point 
of stability, conflict could still return during implementation of the oversight scheme, given the 
nonbinding nature of the MOU.”).  
90. Josh Dhyani, Science-Based Food Labels: Improving Regulations & Preventing Consumer 
Deception Through Limited Information Disclosure Requirements, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 20 
(2016) (“[U]p until 1990, regulation had conveyed to consumers that what appeared on food labels was 
there to provide information about the nuturitional value of food and protect consumer expectations as 












generally be employed only when a market failure has resulted in consumers 
not being adequately informed. 
A. Primary Interests 
Labeling regulation is focused on satisfying consumer informational 
needs and desires.91 A consumer’s primary informational interest when 
buying food is knowing the content of that food,92 and therefore content 
disclosure has been the primary purpose of labeling regulations.93 An 
important informational goal of labeling regulation is satisfying the 
consumer’s interest in knowing the health and nutrition of food, because 
these aspects of food have tangible physical effects on consumers’ bodies.94 
This interest is currently satisfied by federally regulated ingredients lists and 
nutritional information disclosure,95 and is also satisfied by product 
descriptions, which are often regulated on content grounds.96 Accurate 
health and nutritional information is beneficial because it allows consumers 
to make informed consumption choices based on the physical effects that 
the food will have on their bodies. 
The content of food determines not just its nutritional value, but also the 
experience of consuming it. Consumers enjoy food because it both fuels 
their bodies and provides them pleasure from eating it.97 For the purpose of 
this Note, I will refer to the broader experience of eating food as “flavor.”98 
 
91. Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, with Special Reference to Genetically Modified 
Foods, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (2017).  
92. 81 percent of those surveyed reported taste to be a significant factor in food purchase 
decisions, and 61 percent reported healthfulness to be a significant factor. Only 39 percent reported 
sustainability to be a significant factor in food purchase decisions. Health and flavor are aspects of 
content, while sustainability is an aspect of the production process. INT’L FOOD INFO. COUNCIL FOUND., 
2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY 38 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY], 
https://www.foodinsight.org/2018-FHS-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X37W-VMXH]. 
93. Dhyani, supra note 90, at 20. 
94. Diana R. H. Winters, Less May Be More: Reading into FDA’s Labeling Requirements, 19 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 427 (2016) (“Mandatory labels are tools to achieve improved health 
outcomes by assisting consumers in making good choices.”). 
95. For a discussion of the development of mandatory nutrition labeling, see Dhyani, supra note 
90, at 15–17. Nutrition labels are frequently used by consumers. See Dan J. Graham & Robert W. Jeffery, 
Predictors of Nutrition Label Viewing During Food Purchase Decision Making: An Eye Tracking 
Investigation, 15 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 189, 194 (2011) (stating that 40 to 60 percent of consumers 
view nutrition information of food when purchasing). 
96. The FDA requires that the name of a product describe “the basic nature of the food or its 
characterizing properties or ingredients.” 21 C.F.R. § 102.5 (2018). The name of a product is important 
for consumer nutrition information because it implies to consumers whether a product is healthy or 
unhealthy. See Graham & Jeffery, supra note 95, at 196 (explaining that shoppers spend less time 
looking at nutritional information where the product name implies it is healthy or unhealthy). 
97. See 2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY, supra note 92. 
98. While food consumption is an experience involving multiple different senses, in common 
parlance people describe whether they like a food in terms of whether it tastes good. People taste flavors, 
hence the sensory experience of consuming a food can be described as a flavor. 











While not conducive to objective regulation, consumers have a substantial 
interest in knowing how their food will taste.99 Since flavor is subjective, 
flavor regulations generally take the form of restrictions on misleading 
product names and descriptions.100 The name and description of a product 
implies not only its ingredients and nutritional value, but also qualities of 
taste and texture that broadly describe the flavor of the food. Beyond 
restrictions on misleading labels, companies are generally able to make 
subjective claims about the flavor of their products. 
B. Secondary Interests 
Secondary interests are those consumer interests that do not involve the 
content of food. One such interest is the consumer interest in knowing the 
process of food production.101 The process of production often affects the 
actual content of food, but when it does not, knowledge of the production 
process may nonetheless serve the consumer interest in ethical 
consumption. Consumers have an interest in consuming food which they 
believe to be ethically produced.102 Ethical indicators on food packaging can 
disclose, for instance, whether foods were grown without synthetic 
pesticides or without the use of genetically modified ingredients.103 Ethical 
indicators allow consumers to make consumption choices which reward 
ethically preferable production techniques.104 
Ethics and nutrition can often get confused from the consumer 
viewpoint—a substantial problem when the primary goal of labeling 
regulation is to make consumers more informed.105 For instance, the label 
“organic” is seen by many as a signal that a product is more nutritious,106 
 
99. See 2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY, supra note 92, at 38. 
100. See Dhyani, supra note 90, at 8–15 (describing how the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s 
restrictions on “false or misleading” labels have been applied over the years to ensure consumers are 
getting what they expect with regard to the content of their food). 
101. Nearly half of consumers surveyed reported that understanding how food is produced is an 
important factor in their purchasing decisions. 2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY, supra note 92, at 44. 
102. Roughly two-fifths of consumers reported the environmental sustainability of food 
production to be an important factor in their food purchasing decisions. 2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY, 
supra note 92, at 44. Similarly, about two-fifths of consumers reported that animal welfare was an 
important factor in their food purchasing decisions. Id. Environmental sustainability and animal welfare 
are both aspects of the food production process which do not affect the content of food and are purely 
matters of ethics.  
103. See Jason Czarnezki et al., Creating Order Amidst Food Eco-Label Chaos, 25 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 281 (2015) (surveying the many different ecological labeling schemes). 
104. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1051–52 (discussing how mandatory disclosure of 
information about the ethics of products, such as whether they harm animals, can influence consumption 
choices). 
105. See id. at 1050–56 (walking through the four major rationales for labeling regulations, all of 
which center around informing consumers). 
106. 55 percent of those surveyed believed that organic produce was healthier than non-organic 












when it is actually an ethical indicator describing a process of production 
involving fewer artificial pesticides and no genetic engineering.107 
Consumer confusion over whether an indicator is about nutrition or ethics 
results in less-informed purchasing decisions and is counterproductive to 
the goal of informing consumers.108 The possibility of harm from this 
confusion means that the optimal regulatory approach should clarify the 
purpose behind a label. 
C. Market Failures 
Because consumers desire labeling of both primary and secondary 
aspects of food, producers, absent a market failure, should supply that 
information to meet consumer demand.109 When such a market failure exists 
regulators must step in to ensure disclosure of desired information.110 The 
core of labeling regulation is thus informing consumers where market 
failure prevents them from being informed.  
In the labeling context, the standard market failure is incomplete 
information, or consumers lacking the information they need to make 
informed consumption choices—potentially including both content and 
process information.111 Once it has been determined that there is a market 
failure, the next question is whether mandating a label will cause more 
benefit than harm.112 While the administrative costs of labeling and the 
benefit to consumers of obtaining desired information are obvious, there are 
also many potential costs of labeling that are more conceptual and difficult 
to quantify.113 Determining whether benefits outweigh costs is therefore 
 
only 33 percent reported doing so for the ethical reason of helping the environment. CARY FUNK & 
BRIAN KENNEDY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE NEW FOOD FIGHTS: U.S. PUBLIC DIVIDES OVER FOOD 
SCIENCE 38 (2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2016/11/PS_201 
6.12.01_Food-Science_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLZ7-MZEN].  
107. The goal of the organic label is to signal use of practices which promote conservation—
namely not using synthetic chemicals, genetic engineering, or various other practices. National Organic 
Program Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2016), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/medi 
a/TheNationalOrganicProgramNov2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/M29Q-HKT4]. 
108. The goal of labeling regulation is generally to provide consumers with information they need 
to make informed consumption choices. Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1050–51. Therefore, when a label 
confuses consumers and causes them to make consumption choices on false grounds, such a label is 
counterproductive to the primary goal of labeling regulation and exacerbates the informational market 
failure. However, if the benefits of reducing an externality outweigh the costs of consumer 
misinformation, a confusing label could potentially be justified. See id. at 1056–68 (discussing the 
intricacies of cost-benefit analysis of labeling requirements).  
109. Id. at 1050–51.  
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1051. Consumer information is a good unto itself, but it also results in the secondary 
benefit of more efficient economic choices. Id. 
112. Id. at 1056. 
113. Costs of labels include: the cognitive cost of consumers having to take the time to consult 
labels, the hedonic cost of consumers feeling bad about participating in consumption which a label says 











often a matter of educated guessing. One way to estimate the net benefit is 
the excess of how much consumers are willing to pay for the label over the 
cost of adding and administering the label.114  
Another common market failure that can justify labeling is the existence 
of negative externalities, also known as third-party effects.115 A negative 
externality is a cost created by one party but incurred by another.116 
Economic efficiency is achieved when externalities are eliminated and 
parties are forced to internalize all of the costs of their decisions.117 A 
common example of a negative externality is the environmental cost of 
pollution—a cost rarely internalized by the companies that cause the 
pollution.118 Ethics labels can internalize part of the cost of externalities by 
allowing customers to “punish” companies by not consuming their products 
when the externalities of production are viewed as unethical.119 For instance, 
if products had to be labeled with the amount of carbon dioxide used to 
produce them, consumers who cared about carbon dioxide emmissions 
could switch to lower emission products, thereby incentiving companies to 
decrease emissions. In cost-benefit analyses of labeling requirements, 
externalities are also an important consideration. The value of economic 
efficiency and equity must be weighed against the costs of labeling.120 
IV. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS FOR REGULATION 
Meat substitutes are not the only food innovations that have recently 
raised regulatory questions. Rather, they are only the latest in a series of 
food innovations made over the last few decades. GMOs and plant-based 
dairy substitutes have forced both the states and the federal government to 
develop regulatory approaches to new food products. These approaches and 
 
is bad, and the hedonic cost of consumers who change their consumption to a less preferred product due 
to labeling. Id. at 1059–60. Benefits to health or morality of production practices can result from 
labeling; however, estimating these benefits requires estimating first the likelihood of consumer 
behavioral changes, and second the effects that such changes will have. This two-part estimation process 
renders accurate prediction difficult. Id. at 1061–64. 
114. Id. at 1062. 
115. Id. at 1051–54. 
116. Externality (Negative Externality or Positive Externality), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 
(Wolters Kluwer desk ed. 2012). 
117. Economic efficiency requires enterprises to bear the cost of the externalities that they create, 
incorporating this cost into the goods produced. Pigovian Efficiency, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 
(Wolters Kluwer desk ed. 2012). 
118. Jeff L. Lewin, Comment, Which Externalities Should We Internalize?—Comment on The 
Role of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsidered by Professor David Hodas, 3 
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 327, 331–32 (1998). 
119. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1051–52 (discussing mandatory labeling as a method of 
protecting third parties, but only to the extent that consumers care about third-party harms). 
120. Id. at 1066–68. When externalities are involved, consumer willingness to pay for a label is a 












the ways in which they developed can shed light on the future of meat 
substitute regulation. 
A. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) 
Before the 2016 passage of the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure 
Standard,121 the United States had no federal GMO labeling requirement.122 
The FDA’s policy toward GMO labeling before 2016 can be found in its 
1992 Statement of Policy.123 The FDA chose not to mandate the labeling of 
GMOs because it found them to be Generally Recognized as Safe 
(GRAS).124 Instead of mandating labeling, the agency allowed non-GMO 
products to label themselves as “GMO free” if such claims could be 
substantiated.125  
It was only after a series of states passed their own GMO labeling laws 
that the federal government decided to reverse its policy and mandate 
labeling. In 2013, Connecticut passed the first GMO labeling law; Maine 
and Vermont quickly followed suit.126 In direct response to state labeling 
regulations, Congress passed the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard 
(BE Standard) and it was signed into law by the President.127 The BE 
Standard preempted state labeling requirements and instituted federal GMO 
labeling requirements.128 
Under the BE Standard, bioengineered products are not treated as any 
more or less safe than non-bioengineered food—effectively accepting the 
FDA position that GMOs are GRAS.129 Nonetheless, the law requires that 
food manufacturers disclose the bioengineered status of food on its 
packaging.130 The law does not mandate “non-GMO” or “non-
bioengineered” labels for products that are not bioengineered, but it does 
 
121. National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 
(2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1639-1639j, 6524). 
122. Courtney Begley, Note, “So Close, Yet So Far”: The United States Follows the Lead of the 
European Union in Mandating GMO Labeling. But Did It Go Far Enough?, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
625, 704 (2017). 
123. Id. at 645. 
124. Id. at 643–44. 
125. Id. at 650–51. 
126. Id. at 691–95. Washington, Oregon, and California also attempted to pass GMO labeling 
laws. These states tried to do so by ballot initiative, but none succeeded, likely due in part to massive 
campaigns against the initiatives by the GMO industry. Id. at 699–700. This precedent of state level 
regulation prompting the federal government to intervene with its own preemptive regulations could 
potentially play out the same with meat substitute labeling given the state level push for legislation 
similar to that passed by Missouri. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
127. Begley, supra note 122, at 704. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 705. 
130. 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(d) (2018). 











allow use of such labels where they are true.131 While this labeling mandate 
satisfied the concerned states, what matters more is whether it was the 
correct choice according to labeling policy considerations. 
GMOs only differ in content from non-GMOs in that they contain DNA 
which does not occur naturally.132 This content difference is ignorable 
because it does not necessarily affect the taste or nutritional value of food.133 
In judging categorically broad labeling, non-categorical differences can be 
ignored. Since the content of GMO food is not necessarily altered, the 
consumer information interest in GMO labeling is fundamentally ethical, 
dealing with the process of production. Therefore, the benefit of mandated 
disclosure of GMO status is increased consumer ethical information which 
remedies an information insufficiency. Since there is no consensus around 
whether GMOs create negative externalities, any benefit from reduced 
externalities is speculative.134 The benefits of mandatory labeling are 
therefore minimal. Mandatory GMO labeling is likely to cause harm. GMO 
disclosure creates the same content versus process confusion as organic 
labels and therefore imposes a significant cost by impairing consumers’ 
ability to make rational choices.135 Since content information is more 
important to consumers and the cost of content misinformation is already 
significant, the cost of content misinformation almost certainly outweighs 
the benefit to consumers of increased ethics information. 
While mandatory GMO labeling remedies a prior lack of ethics 
disclosure, it comes at the cost of consumer confusion.136 Because the 
benefits of this regulation do not clearly outweigh its costs, GMO labeling 
serves as a cautionary example of what could occur in meat substitute 
labeling. When states act on a labeling issue, the federal government may 
be pressured into making suboptimal policy in order to preempt state 
laws.137 Since states are likely to act out of self-interest in regulating meat 
 
131. See 7 U.S.C. § 6524 (2018) (stating that organic certification is sufficient to allow a product 
to identify itself as “non-GMO” or “not bioengineered”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1639c(c) (2018) (stating 
that a food may not claim to be “non-GMO” or “not bioengineered” just because it is not required to 
disclose that it is bioengineered under 7 U.S.C. § 1639b); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for 
Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Derived from 
Genetically Engineered Plants, No. FDA-2000-D-0075 (Mar. 2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-inf 
ormation/search-fda-guidance-documents/guidance-industry-voluntary-labeling-indicating-whether-fo 
ods-have-or-have-not-been-derived [https://perma.cc/9CUW-S8UX]. 
132. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1069. 
133. See supra part III.A. 
134. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1072–75. While there is a scientific consensus that GMOs are 
safe to consume, the question of whether they may cause environmental harm is somewhat more up in 
the air. Id.  
135. See 2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY, supra note 92, at 43 (showing that 40 percent of survey 
respondents thought that lack of GMO ingredients in a product meant that the product was healthier). 
136. Id. 












substitutes, state labeling policy is unlikely to be made according to the 
proper regulatory considerations. If the federal government feels pressured 
to preempt state labeling of meat substitutes there is a risk that, just like with 
GMOs, the federal government will again adopt suboptimal labeling 
requirements. 
B. Plant-Based Dairy Substitutes 
The market for plant-based dairy substitutes has grown massively in the 
past few years.138 The most common of these products, plant-based milk, 
had yearly sales of $1.6 billion in 2018.139 And, in 2018, plant-based milk 
comprised 15 percent of total “milk” sales and continues to grow in 
popularity as cow milk sales decrease.140 Between plant-based milks, 
creamers, cheeses, and yogurts, plant-based dairy products have almost two 
billion dollars in yearly U.S. sales.141 
Plant-based milk products are generally referred to by the name of the 
dairy product they are imitating, modified by the plant from which they are 
derived—most familiar in the cases of soy milk, almond milk, and coconut 
milk.142 Despite this common labeling practice, the FDA defines milk as 
“the lacteal secretion . . . obtained by the complete milking of one or more 
healthy cows.”143 This definition curiously excludes not only plant-based 
products but also milk obtained from other mammals, such as goats.144 This 
narrow definition, encompassing only a portion of the ordinary 
understanding of milk, is perhaps the reason for the FDA’s longstanding 
policy of non-enforcement.145 For decades, the FDA has known about the 
 
138. See Plant Based Foods Ass’n, supra note 7. 
139. Id. at 1. Yearly sales here are calculated based on Nielsen data over a fifty-two-week period 
ending on June 16, 2018. Id. at 2. 
140. In 2018, plant-based milk sales increased by 9 percent, while cow milk sales were down 6 
percent. Id. at 1. 
141. See id. at 1–2. 
142. See Katie Gates Calderon et al., Dairy vs. Plant-Based ‘Milks’: A Regulatory Standoff, 
LAW360 (Aug. 24, 2017, 10:59 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/957097/dairy-vs-plant-based-mi 
lks-a-regulatory-standoff. 
143. 21 C.F.R. § 131.110(a) (2018). 
144. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med., Comment Letter on Proposed Nutrition Innovation 
Strategy 2 (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2018-N-
2381-0723&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/7WER-MAJ9] (“By focusing 
solely on cows, this standard excludes more than 13 percent of the animal milk—such as that from goats, 
sheep, and buffalo—sold worldwide for human consumption.”). 
145. See Calderon et al., supra note 142 (explaining that, despite pressure from the dairy and 
dairy-substitute industries to either enforce or change the definition of milk, the FDA has refused to take 
either course of action). 











labeling practices for plant-based milk but has opted not to enforce its 
definition of milk.146  
However, this policy of non-enforcement may soon end. In July 2018, 
the Commissioner of the FDA, Scott Gottlieb, announced that the agency 
would reevaluate its stance on labeling enforcement and its definition of 
milk.147 Gottlieb stressed the importance of informing consumers, 
particularly on the matter of nutritional differences.148 Given how 
entrenched plant-based milk and its labeling practices have become,149 it is 
possible that the FDA will opt to revise its regulations to fit the current 
norms. However, the agency could just as easily decide to fight the norms 
and institute new mandatory labeling practices. With over a year passing 
since the beginning of the reevaluation process, the future of plant-based 
milk labeling remains uncertain. 
Plant-based milk is fundamentally different from traditional milk in its 
content—it differs in both taste and nutrition.150 However, since plant-based 
milk does somewhat resemble milk in flavor, the nutritional difference is 
more important.151 There is no obvious argument for plant-based milk being 
ethically inferior to traditional milk—in fact, the opposite is likely true.152 
Given the content difference, the next question is whether there is a market 
failure wherein differences between the products are not being disclosed.153 
Labeling conventions for plant-based milk explicitly disclose that the 
product is different from traditional milk,154 so to the extent that consumers 
take that disclosure to imply differences in nutrition there is no market 
 
146. See id. The FDA can enforce its definitions against products which are misbranded, meaning 
they are: (1) an imitation of a defined food, (2) not explicitly labeled as an “imitation,” and (3) 
“nutritionally inferior” to the defined food or misleadingly labeled. 21 C.F.R. § 101.3(e) (2018). The 
FDA has stated that it believes plant-based milk products are mislabeled under this standard but has not 
gone beyond warning producers. See Warning Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Long H. Lai, 
Lifesoy, Inc. (Aug. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Lifesoy Warning Letter], https://www.fdalabelcompliance.com 
/letters/ucm1048184 [https://perma.cc/W6LZ-3DNH]. 
147. Press Statement, Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., On the Process FDA Is 
Undertaking for Reviewing and Modernizing the Agency’s Standards of Identity for Dairy Products 
(July 26, 2018) [hereinafter Gottlieb Statement], https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressanno 
uncements/ucm614851.htm [https://perma.cc/C2LX-VEZ5].  
148. Id. 
149. See Calderon et al., supra note 142. 
150. See Katie Kindelan, Pros and Cons of Plant-Based Milks: Is a Plant-Based Milk Right for 
You?, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Wellness/pros-cons-plant-b 
ased-milks-plant-based-milk/story?id=53080449 [https://perma.cc/57XV-WT6C] (examining the 
nutritional and flavor differences between traditional milk and plant-based milk, as well as the 
differences between seven plant-based milks). 
151. See id. (stating that plant-based milks are made from ground nuts or other plants mixed with 
water to sufficiently approximate cow milk and to act as a substitute for it). 
152. See Reese, supra note 10 (showing the widespread sentiment that factory farming and the 
treatment of farm animals, including dairy cows, are unethical). 
153. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1050–52. 












failure. However, if consumers take the word “milk” to imply not only 
something about the taste of a product but also something about its 
nutritional value, then a market failure of consumer misinformation is 
occurring.155 As Gottlieb correctly asserts, the fundamental issue with plant-
based milk is the potential nutritional misinformation.156 Since plant-based 
milk is a more established, but largely analogous product to plant-based 
meat, its economic success and regulatory history potentially give insight 
into the future of plant-based meat. 
V. RECOMMENDED LABELING REGULATION  
A. Plant-Based Meat 
Consumers have an interest in knowing the content of plant-based 
meats.157 The primary content labeling issue for plant-based meats is what 
the product can or must be called. Some, like lawmakers in Missouri, argue 
that plant-based products cannot be identified as “meat” because that 
identification causes content confusion.158 This confusion allegedly results 
since plant-based meat does not contain animal products.159 This mistaken 
argument takes an overly formalistic view of content disclosure. Content 
disclosure is about ingredients, but it is also about nutrition and flavor.160 
Disallowing representation as “meat” would mean that consumers would 
have less accurate information about the flavor of plant-based meats.161 
This is not to say that plant-based meats should be able to identify as 
“meat” without caveat. Such a practice would fail to satisfy the consumer 
interest in nutritional content information. Consumers should know that 
they are consuming plant and not animal products, and that as a result the 
food will have different nutritional consequences.162 To convey nutritional 
content information, plant-based meats should be clearly identified as a 
plant product. There is some question as to whether labeling an item as a 
plant product is sufficient to communicate nutritional differences, but absent 
 
155. Even though products have to disclose nutrition information, consumers are less likely to 
look at that nutrition information when they think they already know it based on the name of a product. 
See Graham & Jeffery, supra note 95, at 196. This is what opens up the possibility of a product name 
alone causing consumer nutritional misinformation.  
156. See Gottlieb Statement, supra note 147. 
157. See 2018 FOOD & HEALTH SURVEY, supra note 92. 
158. See Martyn, supra note 52; see also text accompanying supra notes 50–54. 
159. See Martyn, supra note 52; see also text accompanying supra note 51. 
160. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
161. The best way to represent the flavor of plant-based meat is to call it meat because it both 
looks and tastes like meat. See Simon, supra note 4. This flavor similarity between plant-based and 
traditional meat even goes beyond that of plant-based and traditional milk. See Kindelan, supra note 
150. 
162. See discussion of consumer content interests supra Section III.A. 











compelling evidence to the contrary it is a safe assumption.163 Conveniently, 
the term “Plant-Based Meat” accurately conveys both nutritional and flavor 
information by identifying the product as being like meat in all but its 
physical contents.164 
While ethical considerations are often a factor in decisions to consume 
plant-based meats, the ethics of the product are found in its content and not 
in its process of production alone.165 Since there is no uniquely procedural 
ethical issue with plant-based meat, there are no ethics labels that might be 
mandated. On similar grounds, there is no case that plant-based meat 
production creates significant negative externalities.166 
Labeling regulation is only necessary when there is a market failure to 
remedy and when labeling mandates will bring more benefit than harm.167 
The information insufficiency that often necessitates labeling is unlikely to 
be present in plant-based meat labeling.168 Because of a growing aversion 
to traditional meat, consumers who purchase plant-based meats will do so 
because they do not contain animal products.169 For this reason, and 
following in the footsteps of plant-based milks, the plant-based meat 
industry will likely adopt product names and labels which clearly identify 
the “meat” as a plant product.170 However, if plant-based meat deviates in 
this regard, labeling regulation to standardize product descriptions may be 
 
163. The names of plant-based milks serve as obvious disclosures that the products are plant-
based. However, the FDA is currently reviewing whether plant-based milks are confusing consumers 
into believing they are nutritionally comparable to traditional milk. See Gottlieb Statement, supra note 
147. Until a definitive answer is provided, the FDA policy of non-enforcement against plant-based milk 
labels supports the assertion that such labels accurately convey nutritional information.  
164. “Plant-Based” gives nutritional content information pertaining to ingredients and physical 
composition. “Meat” gives content information regarding flavor and nutrition. See discussion of what 
“meat” means infra Section V.B. When these terms are combined, the nutritional information supplied 
by “Plant-Based” negates the nutritional information that the term “Meat” typically provides.  
165. The primary ethical reasons to eat plant-based meats are to avoid animal suffering and the 
environmental costs of traditional meat production. See discussion supra Section I.A. These ethical 
differences occur because traditional meat involves raising animals while plant-based meat involves 
growing plants. Despite involving the production process, these production differences result in 
fundamentally different contents of the two products, meaning specific ethical disclosures are 
unnecessary if consumers are adequately informed about content. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
166. Assuming that when consumers choose plant-based meats they are doing so as a substitute 
for consuming traditional meat, then what matters is not whether plant-based meats produce any negative 
externalities, but whether they produce more negative externalities than traditional meat. Plant-based 
meats do not produce more negative externalities than traditional meat, the production of which creates 
a massive amount of negative externalities. See discussion of the externalities of traditional meat 
production infra Section V.C. 
167. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
168. For a discussion of the market failure of information insufficiency, see discussion supra 
Section III.C. 
169. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
170. See Calderon et al., supra note 142 (describing how plant-based companies label their 












required.171 Alternatively, if the FDA finds that the product names in the 
plant-based milk industry have caused nutritional confusion, it would follow 
that names of a similar style in the plant-based meat industry would cause 
nutritional confusion as well. Under such circumstances, it may be proper 
to mandate that plant-based meats be identified as “imitation” meat.172 
B. In Vitro Meat 
Because in vitro meat is in its infancy and is likely to become 
indistinguishable from traditional meat in its composition and flavor,173 for 
the purpose of this analysis I will assume that in vitro meat is in fact 
indistinguishable in content from traditional meat.174 Given this content 
indistinguishability, the issue of whether in vitro meat should be able to 
identify as “meat” is clear—it should. “Meat” as a term conveys information 
about flavor and about a composition of animal fat and muscle cells. To 
argue that “meat” is a process term indicating whether a product came out 
of an animal carcass, as Missouri does,175 is to ignore the consumer 
perspective. To illustrate this point, one need only consider the outcome of 
a blind taste test. If a person eats in vitro meat with no knowledge of what 
it is or how it was produced, the consumer would clearly call it meat because 
it looks, tastes, and feels like meat.176 The process of production would 
probably never cross the consumer’s mind. Since in vitro meat fits the 
 
171. If a plant-based product is only identified as “meat,” it will fail to provide consumers with 
important content information necessary for informed consumer decision making. See discussion supra 
Section III.A. 
172. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.3(e) (2018); Lifesoy Warning Letter, supra note 146. 
173. See Mattick & Allenby, supra note 2, at 68–70.  
174. Beyond becoming indistinguishable in content from traditional meat, in vitro meat also has 
the potential to become superior to traditional meat in both nutrition and flavor. See id.; see also 
discussion accompanying supra note 34. This presents interesting regulatory issues which an application 
of basic principles can shed some light on. Fundamental principles say content differences must be 
disclosed to consumers. See discussion supra Section III.A. Regulation is necessary where the market is 
not supplying information needed for informed decision making. See discussion supra Section III.C. If 
an in vitro meat producer sells a meat product which is superior in content to traditional meat, that 
producer has an economic interest in disclosing this superiority to consumers. Therefore, a market failure 
of information insufficiency would not be likely to occur, and regulation would not be necessary. 
175. The new Missouri law aimed at avoiding consumer confusion defines meat based solely on 
the process of production, specifically whether meat is “derived from harvested production livestock or 
poultry.” MO. REV. STAT. § 265.494(7) (2018). 
176. This hypothetical illustrates that food names function practically as descriptions of the 
sensory experience of consuming that food. This experience is fundamentally one of flavor, as I have 
defined that term for the purposes of this analysis. See text accompanying supra note 98. While food 
names can imply other things, such as nutrition or the process of production, a definition of a food name 
that entirely ignores the experience of consumption is fundamentally flawed and is ill-suited to satisfy 
the consumer interest in content information. 











content definition of “meat,” there is no reason to add a content-based caveat 
like there is with plant-based meat.177 
While the consumer interest in content information is satisfied without 
additional labeling requirements, the same is not true for process 
information. In vitro meat is made through a very different process than 
traditional meat.178 This different process raises positive and negative 
ethical issues depending on the individual, meaning that there is a consumer 
interest in knowing the process of in vitro meat production.179 For example, 
some consumers may believe that in vitro meat is unnatural, while others 
may believe that in vitro meat is ethically superior to traditional meat 
because it does not require the slaughter of an animal. Therefore, if there is 
a market failure in providing information about the ethics of production, 
ethics labeling of in vitro meat should be mandated.180 
In vitro meat produces no significant externalities but could raise an issue 
of information insufficiency.181 As long as in vitro meat is more expensive 
than traditional meat, there will be a strong financial incentive for in vitro 
meat labeling to disclose its ethical differences in order to sell an otherwise 
identical product at a higher price. Therefore, in the near future there will 
be no information insufficiency to remedy. However, if and when in vitro 
meat can outcompete traditional meat on price alone, the incentive to 
disclose ethical differences will diminish.182 At that point, mandated ethics 
labeling could serve to remedy the resulting information insufficiency. 
 
177. The “Plant-Based” caveat to use of the word “Meat,” I argue, is necessary to inform 
consumers of content differences as compared to traditional meat. See discussion supra Section V.A. A 
similar “In Vitro” caveat to the word “Meat” in the labeling of in vitro meat would provide no valuable 
content differentiation because the content of in vitro and traditional meat is assumed to be the same for 
purposes of analysis.  
178. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
179. Some people will have ethical qualms about consuming in vitro meat, and will therefore have 
a strong interest in knowing whether or not the meat they consume was produced in vitro. See Bryant et 
al., supra note 42, at 12–14 (discussing ethical qualms some consumers have with in vitro meat, ranging 
from its perceived unnaturalness to the effect it could have on the livelihood of traditional farmers). 
Others will have a strong interest in consuming in vitro meat to avoid contributing to the ethical issues 
associated with the production of traditional meat. Id. at 14 (stating that consumers with positive 
perceptions of in vitro meat are particularly interested in the potential for in vitro meat to “improve 
animal welfare” and “be more environmentally friendly than conventional meat”).  
180. See discussion of information insufficiency supra Section III.C. 
181. Because in vitro meat is a substitute for traditional meat, its negative externalities must be 
greater than those of traditional meat for a labeling mandate to be justified on the basis of reducing 
negative externalities. Externality labels aim to use consumer ethics to shift consumption to products 
which are produced with fewer negative externalities, hence a more efficiently produced substitute 
should not bear a label based on externalities. See discussion of externalities supra Section III.C. Since 
traditional meat produces substantial negative externalities, it is acceptable to assume in vitro meat will 
produce fewer. See discussion of traditional meat externalities infra Section V.C. 
182. A substantial group of people will not want to consume in vitro meat, even if it is cheaper. 
See Bryant et al., supra note 42, at 12–14 (explaining that many people have a negative view of in vitro 












Such labeling would only make sense if the benefits of labeling outweigh 
the costs. One potentially significant cost would be consumer 
misinformation about the content of in vitro meat. Process labels are often 
confused for content labels,183 and this confusion imposes the cost of 
consumer content misinformation and the inefficient consumption choices 
that result.184 The benefits of labeling would be consumers having greater 
access to desired ethics information and the resulting efficient 
consumption.185 But without knowing how consumers at large will view 
terms like “in vitro meat” in the future, it is impossible to say whether the 
costs or benefits will be more significant. As a result, it is impossible to say 
whether ethics labeling should be mandated at that future date.186 
C. Traditional Meat 
Having considered the labeling of the two primary substitutes for 
traditional meat, one can also consider a hypothetical future where these 
substitutes have achieved cost and quality parity with traditional meat. In 
such a future, it would make sense to flip the regulatory focus and consider 
how traditional meat should be labeled.187 While it does not raise content 
labeling issues,188 the production of traditional meat is ethically troubling.  
Production of traditional meat is also economically inefficient—it 
creates many negative externalities, all of which raise ethical issues. One 
major externality is the environmental impact of traditional meat 
production.189 Traditional meat production results in substantial greenhouse 
 
and price, or appealing to the entire population on price alone, these companies will likely decide to 
appeal to the broader audience: the entire population. 
183. See discussion of content versus process confusion supra Section III.B. 
184. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1051 (describing the need for informed consumers in order 
for a market to work efficiently). 
185. See id. (explaining that the information consumers want to know often includes the ethics of 
production). 
186. If, for instance, consumers have come to understand that traditional meat and in vitro meat 
are identical in content, mandatory ethics labeling would be unlikely to cause confusion and as a result 
would likely be appropriate. However, if a substantial group continue to view in vitro meat with 
suspicion regarding its content and nutrition, then ethics labeling may be confused for content labels and 
as a result be inappropriate. 
187. While an application of labeling regulation analysis to traditional meat could be performed 
today, it would not make much sense to do so because meat substitutes are not yet commercially viable 
alternatives. For instance, an ethics label disclosing that a particular meat product comes from killing 
animals would be laughable since that proposition is currently a given. Furthermore, without 
substantially similar alternatives, consumers are unlikely to change their behavior away from traditional 
meat consumption as a result of ethics labeling.  
188. The content definition for “meat” is, for the time being, built around the concept of traditional 
meat. See discussion of content supra Section V.A–B. Therefore, traditional meat is necessarily identical 
in content to “meat.” 
189. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text. 











gas emissions, deforestation, and decreases in biodiversity.190 These and 
other environmental effects come with substantial costs.191 Traditional meat 
production also creates a darker externality—intentionally inflicted animal 
suffering. Each year in the United States, over nine billion animals are 
slaughtered for human consumption.192 While putting a value on life and 
suffering is difficult, many people think animal suffering is bad, and some 
are willing to radically change their behavior to avoid it.193 Given these 
substantial externalities, a more economically efficient system would try to 
make traditional meat producers internalize these externalized costs.194 One 
way to do this via labeling regulation would be to mandate that traditional 
meat disclose its externalities on its packaging. People like the environment 
and do not like death;195 if traditional meat producers were to disclose that 
their production methods are bad on both counts, consumers might be less 
willing to purchase traditional meat at the same price as meat products that 
were produced more ethically. This financial “punishment” for unethical 
externalities would impose costs for economically inefficient production, 
encouraging a shift to more economically efficient production methods.196 
Consumers also have an interest in being informed about the ethical 
issues with traditional meat production.197 Consumers largely oppose 
production practices that harm animals,198 and favor environmental 
 
190. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
191. The costs of climate change as a result of greenhouse gas emissions alone could climb into 
the multiple trillions of dollars by 2100. FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, NAT’L RES. 
DEF. COUNCIL, THE COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT WE’LL PAY IF GLOBAL WARMING CONTINUES 
UNCHECKED, at iv (2008), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/cost.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BC3-
J9EU]. 
192. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., POULTRY SLAUGHTER: 2017 
SUMMARY 4–5 (2018) (9.3 billion poultry slaughtered); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. 
STATISTICS SERV., LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER: 2017 SUMMARY 6 (2018) (156 million livestock 
slaughtered). 
193. Many people choose to abstain from consuming animals on moral grounds. See supra notes 
8–11 and accompanying text. Many more are uncomfortable with animal suffering in the production of 
meat. See Reese, supra note 10 (presenting suvey data showing widespread discomfort with animal 
treatment in food production as well as factory farming more broadly). 
194. See discussion of externalities supra Section III.C. 
195. A majority of Americans prioritize environmental protection over economic growth, and 
commanding majorities also favor environmentally friendly policies like emission caps, stricter pollution 
standards, and increased government funding for developing renewable energy infrastructure. In Depth: 
Topics A to Z: Environment, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/EF93-M8NF] (with the exception of a brief period following the Great Recession, when polled, 
people preferred protection of the environment over economic growth).  
196. It should be noted that labeling regulation is not the most efficient way to force internalization 
of costs. For instance, many externalities can be entirely internalized via taxes implemented solely to 
serve that purpose. See Lewin, supra note 118, at 345–46. Other externalities, like animal suffering, are 
not so easily quantifiable into a tax and may be partly internalized via labeling regulation to avoid tough 
questions of valuation. 
197. See discussion of the consumer interest in ethics information supra Section III.B. 












protection.199 Traditional meat producers therefore have an economic 
incentive not to tell consumers about their problematic production practices. 
This results in a market failure of insufficient information, where the 
producers refuse to provide information which consumers would value.200 
Mandated disclosure of the environmental impact and animal suffering that 
result from traditional meat production is therefore justified by both market 
failures. 
Such disclosure requirements would likely produce vastly more benefits 
than harms. The externalities of traditional meat are extensive and harmful. 
While an exact valuation of the reduction of such externalities and the 
increased economic efficiency that would result from labeling is impossible, 
a significant benefit can be assumed based on the extent of the current harm 
and consumer sentiment. Similarly, the benefit to consumers of increased 
information would be significant. The cost of implementing and 
administering the labeling regulation would therefore be small in 
comparison to the potential benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
As global meat consumption continues to rise, the substantial issues 
caused by current meat production techniques are only going to get worse 
if nothing changes.201 Plant-based and in vitro meat are an answer to this 
problem. These products offer an alternative to traditional meat which might 
drastically reduce animal suffering and environmental harm without 
requiring humanity to change its food preferences. It is this potential that 
makes well-considered labeling regulation important.  
Fortunately, meat substitutes do not need to be given special treatment 
to avoid onerous labels. The federal government already mandates food 
labeling, and usually does so with rational consideration of the important 
interests at stake. If meat substitutes are allowed labels which best satisfy 
consumer informational interests and remedy likely market failures, then 
meat substitutes will be able to compete fairly against traditional meat.202 
However, there is a danger that the federal government will not rationally 
regulate meat substitutes.203 State legislation pushed by the traditional meat 
industry is already being enacted to prevent inevitable competition by 
 
199. See In Depth: Topics A to Z: Environment, supra note 195. 
200. See discussion of information insufficiency supra Section III.C. 
201. See LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW, supra note 13. 
202. See discussion of meat substitute labeling supra Section V.A–B. 
203. See discussion of GMO labeling as an example of how the federal government can be 
pressured into mandating suboptimal labels supra Section IV.A. 











ethically superior meat products.204 Ultimately, the future of meat 
substitutes depends on federal regulators acting according to principles 
rather than succumbing to the pressure of entrenched economic interests. If 
this can be accomplished, humanity will be one step closer to solving some 
of its most consequential environmental and ethical problems. 
Tate J. Salisbury* 
 
204. See discussion of Missouri’s labeling law supra Section II.A; see also Selyukh, supra note 
68. 
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